Book 1
13.10
In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a worthless person, or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure anotherRoemer reads, after Dittmeyer, εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ [τούτου ἀφ’ οὗ ἔλαβε] καὶ . . . from the old Latin translation or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases as in these.
13.11
We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds.
13.12
One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like;Laws are special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general law (not the same as the general law based upon nature sect. 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by a remarkable degree ( καθ’ ὑπερβολήν) of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honored or dishonored, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of mankind. the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law.
