Book 3
17.1
Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should bear upon the particular point disputed; for instance, if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else; or if it is maintained that no injury has been done; or that the act was not so important as asserted; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being matters of dispute just as the question of fact.
17.2
But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarilyAristotle's argument is as follows. But it must not be forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. you hit me, no, I didn't, where both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e. because here you can prove or disprove that A is πονηρός). The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In his note he says: all that is meant is that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this issue, in which this topic may be safely used. For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily πονηρός. be a rogue; for ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in the others.
