Book 1
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Well, tell me; are all things which are judged good and proper by some rightly judged to be so? Thus, is it possible that the several opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food should all be right?
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How can it be possible?
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I suppose, then, it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong; if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad.
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How can it be otherwise?
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And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of wisdom and instruction in the most necessary points.
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It is granted.
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Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply yourself to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to learn the criterion of what is agreeable to nature; and to use that in judging of each particular case. At present the assistance I have to give you towards what you desire is this: Does affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing?
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How should it be otherwise?
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Well, and is affection natural and right, and reason not so?
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By no means.
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Is there any opposition, then, between reason and affection?
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I think not.
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Suppose there were; if one of two opposites be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural, must it not?
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It must.
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What we find, then, to accord at once with love and reason, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.
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Agreed.
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Well, then; you will not dispute this, that to run away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider whether it be consistent with affection.
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Let us consider it.
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Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away and leaving her? Has her mother no affection for the child?
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Yes, surely she has.
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Would it have been right, then, that her mother too should leave her, or would it not?
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It would not.
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And does not her nurse love her?
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She does.
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Then ought she likewise to leave her?
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By no means.
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And does not her preceptor love her?
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He does.
