Book 1
22
The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another; for which of us does not admit that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to be pursued and followed? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming? Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases; as when one cries, Such a person has acted well,—he is a gallant man; and another, No, he has acted like a fool. Hence arise disputes among men. This is the dispute between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans,—not whether the right be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be sought; but whether the eating swine’s flesh be consistent with right, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon; for call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon,—ought not that to be done which is fit and right? Yes, surely. Achilles, what say you,—is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done? Yes; I desire it beyond everything. Apply your principles then. Here begins the dispute. One says, It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father. The other says, Yes; but it is. One or the other of them, certainly, makes a wrong conception of the principle of fitness. Again, the one says, If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some of your prizes. The other answers, What, that you should take my mistress? Ay; yours. What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?
