15
Will you, gentlemen of the jury, empower this man to punish his benefactor, to banish his saviour, to hate the one who made him sane, to take vengeance on the one who set him on his feet? Not if you do what is just. For if I were really now guilty of the greatest offences, there was no slight gratitude owing me previously; keeping this in sight and in mind, he would have done well to ignore the present and to be prompt to forgive for the sake of the past, especially if the benefaction were so great as to overtop everything subsequent. That, I think, is true of mine toward this man, whom I saved, who is my debtor for the whole of his life, to whom I have given existence, sanity, and intelligence, and that at a time when all the others had finally given up and were confessing themselves defeated by the malady.
16
My benefaction, I think, is the greater because, although I was not his son at that time and had no imperative reason to take the case but was free and independent, having been released from the responsibility imposed by nature, nevertheless I was not indifferent but came voluntarily, unsummoned, on my own initiative; I gave my assistance, lavished my attentions, brought about a cure, and set my father on his feet, preserving him for myself, pleading my own cause against his disownment, stilling his anger by my friendliness, annulling the law by my love, purchasing by a great benefaction my reentrance into the family, demonstrating my loyalty to my father at a crisis so dangerous, bringing about my own adoption with the help of my profession, and proving myself a legitimate son in his time of dire need.
