16.7
Of his victory, which was so noised about, he made no use whatever, but after a few days had elapsed withdrew again to Naxos, and there spent the winter, making large outlays on his vast armament, but effecting little in his negotiations with the few Sicels who thought of coming over to his side. The Syracusans therefore plucked up courage again, marched out to Catana, ravaged the fields, and burnt what had been the Athenian camp.
16.8
These things all men laid to the charge of Nicias, since, as they said, by his excessive calculation and hesitation and caution he let the proper time for action go by for ever. When he was once in action no one could find fault with the man, for after he set out to do a thing he was vigorous and effective; but in venturing out to do it he was hesitating and timid.
17.1
At any rate, when he moved his armament back to Syracuse,In the spring of 414 B.C.. as described in Thuc. 6.97. he showed such generalship, and made his approach with such speed and safety, that he put in at Thapsus with his fleet and landed his men unobserved, seized EpipolaeA triangular plateau, rising gradually to the westwards of Syracuse, visible from the interior of the city, and surrounded by precipitous cliffs. before the enemy could prevent, defeated the picked companies which came to its rescue, killing three hundred men, and even routed the cavalry of the enemy, which was thought to be invincible.
17.2
But what most of all filled the Sicilians with terror and the Hellenes with incredulity was the fact that in a short time he carried a wall around Syracuse, a city fully as large as Athens, although the unevenness of the territory about it, its proximity to the sea and its adjacent marshes, made the task of surrounding it with such a wall very difficult.
