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This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at present, but that other point maybe assumed from this discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede that the irrational part is essentially different from judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which they say that emotion becomes greater and more violent; their contention is concerning the name and the expression, but they really surrender the point at issue to those who assert that the passionate and irrational element is different from the reasoning and judging. In his book On the Failure to Lead a Consistent Life Chrysippus Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 94; the title was interpreted by Xylander as De Dissensione Partium Animi. has said, Anger is a blind thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters, and often it obscures matters which are already apprehended; and, proceeding a little further, he says, For the passions, when once raised, drive out the processes of reasoning and all things that appear otherwise than they would have them be, and push forward with violence to actions contrary to reason. He then uses as evidence the words of MenanderFrag. 567, Kock, Comic. Att. Frag., iii. p. 173 (Allinson, p. 497).: Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were My wits awandering in my body then When I made choice to do not this, but that? And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that every rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet often reason is rejected when we are under the impulse of some other more violent force. Thus in this passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason.
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Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato Republic, 430 e. says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not.
