3
Aristotle Cf.448 a, infra, and the note. at first made use of these principles to a very great extent, as is obvious from his writings. But later Cf.De Anima, iii. 9 (432 a 25); Magna Moralia, i. 1 (1182 a 24); Ethica Eudemia, ii. 1. 15 (1219 b 28); Ethica Nicomachea, i. 13. 9 (1102 a 29); Iamblichus, Protrepticus, 7 (p. 41 ed. Pistelli). he assigned the spirited to the appetitive part, on the ground that anger is a sort of appetite and desire to cause pain in requital Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, i. 1 (403 a 30); Seneca, De Ira, i. 3. 3.; to the end, however, he continued to treat the passionate and irrational part as distinct from the rational, not because this part is wholly irrational, as is the perceptive part of the soul, or the nutritive and vegetative part (for these parts are completely unsubmissive and deaf to reason and, so to speak, mere off-shoots of our flesh and wholly attached to the body), but though the passionate part is wanting in reason and has no reason of its own, yet otherwise it is by nature fitted to heed the rational and intelligent part, to turn toward it, to yield to it, to conform itself thereto, if it is not completely corrupted by foolish pleasure and a life of no restraint.
