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AUTOBULUS. But let us grant that sensation needs no help of intelligence to perform its own function; nevertheless, when the perception that has caused an animal to distinguish between what is friendly and what is hostile is gone, what is it that from this time on remembers the distinction, fears the painful, and wants the beneficial ? And, if what it wants is not there, what is there in animals that devises means of acquiring it and providing lairs and hiding-places - both traps for prey and places of refuge from attackers ? And yet those very authorsThe Stoics again; von Arnim, S.V.F. iii, p. 41, Chrysippus, frag. 173 of the Ethica. rasp our ears by repeatedly defining in their Introductions Or elementary treatises: titles used by Chrysippus (von Arnim, op. cit. ii, pp. 6 f.; iii, p. 196). purpose as an indication of intent to complete, design as an impulse before an impulse, preparation as an act before an act, and memory as an apprehension of a proposition in the past tense of which the present tense has been apprehended by perception. That is, by sensation we apprehend the proposition Socrates is snub-nosed, by memory the proposition Socrates was snub-nosed. The literature on this complicated subject has been collected and analysed in Class. Rev. lxvi (1952), pp. 146 f. For there is not one of these terms that does not belong to logic; and the acts are all present in all animals as, of course, are cognitions which, while inactive, they call notions, but when they are once put into action, concepts. And though they admit that emotions one and all are false judgements and seeming truths, Cf. von Arnim, op. cit. i, pp. 50 f; iii, pp. 92 ff.; see also Mor. 449 c. it is extraordinary that they obviously fail to note many things that animals do and many of their movements that show anger or fear or, so help me, envy or jealousy. They themselves punish dogs and horses that make mistakes, not idly but to discipline them; they are creating in them through pain a feeling of sorrow, which we call repentance.
