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At this point in my discourse, I imagine that I shall do well not to omit the case of the fox, since it is so similar. Now the story-booksThe authorities on Deucalion’s Flood are assembled by Frazer on Apollodorus, i. 7. 2 (L.C.L.), and more completely in his Folk-Lore in the Old Testament, i, pp. 146 ff. Plutarch is the only Greek author to add the Semitic dove story, though Lucian (De Dea Syria, 12 ff.) was to add to the other major contaminations. tell us that when Deucalion released a dove from the ark, as long as she returned, it was a certain sign that the storm was still raging; but as soon as she flew away, it was a harbinger of fair weather. So even to this day the Thracians, Cf. 949 d supra and the note. whenever they propose crossing a frozen river, make use of a fox as an indicator of the solidity of the ice. The fox moves ahead slowly and lays her ear to the ice; if she perceives by the sound that the stream is running close underneath, judging that the frozen part has no great depth, but is only thin and insecure, she stands stock still and, if she is permitted, returns to the shore; but if she is reassured by the absence of noise, she crosses over. And let us not declare that this is a nicety of perception unaided by reason; it is, rather, a syllogistic conclusion developed from the evidence of perception: What makes noise must be in motion; what is in motion is not frozen; what is not frozen is liquid; what is liquid gives way. So logiciansSpecifically Chrysippus (Cf. von Arnim, S.V.F. ii, pp. 726 f.). Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i. 69 (the whole passage i. 62-72 is worth reading); Aelian, De Natura Animal. vi. 59; Philo, 45 (p. 122). assert that a dog, at a point where many paths split off, makes use of a multiple disjunctiveFor the form of the syllogism see Diogenes Laertius, vii. 81. argument and reasons with himself: Either the wild beast has taken this path, or this, or this. But surely it has not taken this, or this. Then it must have gone by the remaining road. Perception here affords nothing but the minor premiss, while the force of reason gives the major premisses and adds the conclusion to the premisses. A dog, however, does not need such a testimonial, which is both false and fraudulent; for it is perception itself, by means of track and spoor, Cf. Shorey on Plato, Republic, 427 e (L.C.L., vol. I, p. 347, note e). which indicates the way the creature fled; it does not bother with disjunctive and copulative propositions. The dog’s true capacity may be discerned from many other acts and reactions and the performance of duties, which are neither to be smelled out nor seen by the eye, but can be carried out or perceived only by the use of intelligence and reason.For the philosophic dog see Plato, op. cit. 376 b; the scholia of Olympiodorus add that Socrates’ famous oath by the dog was symbolic of the creature’s rational nature. See also Sinclair, Class. Rev. xlii (1948), p. 61; the parallel passages are collected by J. E. B. Mayor, Class. Rev. xii (1898), pp. 93 ff. I should only make myself ridiculous if I described the dog’s self-control and obedience and sagacity on hunting parties to you who see and handle these matters every day.
