Kitap 2
10.66
Pompey’s supplies came from every quarter, for the roads, harbors, and strongholds had been so provided beforehand that food was brought to him at all times from the land, and every wind blew it to him from the sea. Caesar, on the other hand, had only what he could find with difficulty and seize by hard labor. Yet even so nobody deserted him, but all, by a kind of divine fury, longed to come to close quarters with the enemy. They considered that they, who had been trained in arms for ten years, were much superior to the new levies of Pompey in fighting, but that for digging ditches and building fortifications and for laborious foraging they were weaker by reason of their age. Tired as they were they altogether preferred to perform some deed of valor rather than perish with hunger in inaction. Pompey perceived this and he considered it dangerous to risk everything on a single battle with disciplined and desperate men, and against the amazing luck of Caesar. It would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no fertile territory, and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships for rapid flight. So he decided on the most prudent calculation to protract the war and wear out the enemy by hunger from day to day.Literally, to lead the enemy around from hunger to hunger, ἐς λιμὸν ἐκ λιμοῦ. Mendelssohn prefers to read ἐς λοιμὸν ἐκ λιμοῦ, from famine to plague, and he refers to Plutarch (Life of Cœsar, 40), who says that it was reported in Pompey’s camp that a pestilence had broken out in Caesar’s army in consequence of their unaccustomed diet. There is no authority for this change nor does it improve the text in any way. As Caesar was living off the country he would be obliged to move frequently from hunger to hunger.
