45
If any man, it begins, and then, any homicide who has quitted the country and whose goods are not confiscate, meaning any man who has migrated by reason of involuntary manslaughter. That is quite clear, because it speaks of those who have quitted the country, not of those who have gone into exile, and because it specifies persons whose goods are not confiscate, for the property of willful murderers is forfeited to the State. The legislator, I say, is speaking of involuntary offenders. To what purport?
46
If they are pursued or violently seized, he says, outside the frontier. What is the significance of outside the frontier? For all homicides alike the frontier implies exclusion from the country of the person slain. From that country he permits them to be pursued and seized; but outside of it he permits neither seizure nor pursuit. For anyone who contravenes this rule he orders the same punishment as if he had done the man wrong at home, in the words, shall incur the same penalty as if he had so acted at home.
47
Now suppose the defendant Aristocrates were asked,—you must not think it a silly question—first if he knows whether Charidemus will be killed by someone, or will die in some other way. He would reply, I take it, that he does not know. However, we will presume that somebody will kill him. Next question: will the man who is to do it be a voluntary or an involuntary agent, an alien or a citizen,—do you know, Aristocrates? You cannot say that you do know.
48
Then of course you ought to have supplied these particulars, and written, if any man, whether alien or citizen, shall kill, with or without intention, rightfully or wrongfully, in order that any man soever, by whom the deed should have been done, might have received his deserts according to law; but assuredly, after merely naming an accusation, you ought not to have added, he shall be liable to seizure. What boundary have you left in this clause?
