5
I am at a loss indeed to understand the feelings which have led my brother to range himself against me. Does he imagine that his duty as a son consists simply in loyalty to his mother? To my mind, it is a far greater sin to neglect the avenging of the dead man; and the more so since he met his doom as the involuntary victim of a plot, whereas she sent him to it by deliberately forming that plot.
6
Further, it is not for my brother to say that he is quite sure his mother did not murder our father for when he had the chance of making sure, by torture, he refused it; he showed readiness only for those modes of inquiry which could yield no certainty. Yet he ought to have been ready to do what I in fact challenged him to do, so that an honest investigation of the facts might have been possible;
7
because then, if the slaves had admitted nothing, he would have confronted me with a vigorous defence based on certainty, and his mother would have been cleared of the present charge. But after refusing to inquire into the facts, how can he possibly be certain of what he refused to find out? [How, then, is it to be expected, gentlemen of the jury, that he should be sure of facts about which he has not learned the truth?See critical note.]
8
What reply does he mean to make to me? He was fully aware that once the slaves were examined under torture his mother was doomed; and he thought that her life depended upon the avoiding of such an examination, as he and his companions imagined that the truth would in that event be lost to sight. How, then, is he going to remain true to his oath as defendant,A curiously loose expression. The oath taken by both parties in cases of murder was always a διωμοσία, (cf. Antiph. 1.28), never as here, an ἀντωμοσία if he claims to be in full possession of the facts after refusing to make certain of them by accepting my offer of a perfectly impartial investigation of the matter by torture?
