9
In the first place, I was ready to torture the defendants’ slaves, who knew that this woman, my opponents’ mother, had planned to poison our father on a previous occasion as well, that our father had caught her in the act, and that she had admitted everything— save that it was not to kill him, but to restore his love that she alleged herself to be giving him the potion.
10
Owing, then, to the nature of the slaves’ evidence, I proposed to have their story tested under torture after making a written note of my charges against this woman; and I told the defence to conduct the examination themselves in my presence, so that the slaves might not give forced answers to questions put by me. I was satisfied to have the written questions used; and that in itself should afford a presumption in my favour that my search for my father’s murderer is honest and impartial. Should the slaves resort to denial or make inconsistent statements, my intention was that the torture should force from them the charges which the facts demanded: for torture will make even those prepared to lie confine their charges to the truth.
11
I am quite sure, though, that had the defence approached me with an offer of their slaves directly they learned that I intended to proceed against my father’s murderer, only to meet with a refusal of the offer, they would have produced that refusal as affording the strongest presumption of their innocence of the murder. As it is, it was I who in the first place volunteered to conduct the examination personally, and in the second told the defence to conduct it themselves in my stead. Surely, then, it is only logical that this corresponding offer and refusal should afford a presumption in my favour that they are guilty of the murder.
