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Euthyphro. Why you don’t suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?
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Socrates. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?
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Euthyphro. What else than honor and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?
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Socrates. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?
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Euthyphro. I think it is precious, above all things.
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Socrates. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.
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Euthyphro. Certainly.
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Socrates. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?
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Euthyphro. Yes, I remember.
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Socrates. Then don’t you see that now you say that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?
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Euthyphro. Certainly.
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Socrates. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.
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Euthyphro. So it seems.
