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Socrates. Well, then, suppose I give a name to some thing or other, designating, for instance, that which we now call man as horse and that which we now call horse as man, will the real name of the same thing be man for the public and horse for me individually, and in the other case horse for the public and man for me individually? Is that your meaning?
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Hermogenes. Yes, that is my opinion.
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Socrates. Now answer this question. Is there anything which you call speaking the truth and speaking falsehood?
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. Then there would be true speech and false speech?
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Hermogenes. Certainly.
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Socrates. Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false?
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. It is possible, then, to say in speech that which is and that which is not?
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Hermogenes. Certainly.
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Socrates. But is true speech true only as a whole, and are its parts untrue?
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Hermogenes. No, its parts also are true.
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Socrates. Are the large parts true, but not the small ones, or are all true?
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Hermogenes. All, in my opinion.
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Socrates. Is there, then, anything which you say is a smaller part of speech than a name?
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Hermogenes. No, that is the smallest.
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Socrates. And the name is spoken as a part of the true speech?
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. Then it is, according to you, true.
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. And a part of false speech is false, is it not?
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Hermogenes. It is.
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Socrates. Then it is possible to utter either a false or a true name, since one may utter speech that is either true or false?
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Hermogenes. Yes, of course.
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Socrates. Then whatever each particular person says is the name of anything, that is its name for that person?
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Hermogenes. Yes.
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Socrates. And whatever the number of names anyone says a thing has, it will really have that number at the time when he says it?