177
SOC. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name advantageous The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be.; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?
177
THEO. Certainly.
177
SOC. Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.
177
THEO. True.
177
SOC. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?
178
THEO. Certainly not.
178
SOC. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?
178
THEO. I should say they do often miss it!
178
SOC. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.
178
THEO. Certainly.