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İngilizce Yunanca

186 SOC. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

186 THEAET. So it seems.

186 SOC. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?

186 THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.

186 SOC. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?

186 THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?

186 SOC. Collectively you call it, then, perception?

186 THEAET. Of course.

186 SOC. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.

186 THEAET. No; certainly not.

186 SOC. Nor knowledge either, then.

186 THEAET. No.

186 SOC. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.

186 THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.

187 SOC. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.

187 THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.

187 SOC. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.

187 THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

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