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İngilizce Yunanca

188 SOC. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

188 THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

188 SOC. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

188 THEAET. Necessarily.

188 SOC. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

188 THEAET. Certainly.

188 SOC. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

188 THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.

188 SOC. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

188 THEAET. That is impossible.

188 SOC. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

188 THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.

188 SOC. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for fake opinion.

188 THEAET. Very true.

188 SOC. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

188 THEAET. What do you mean?

188 SOC. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

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