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İngilizce Yunanca

188 THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.

188 SOC. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them? We, I fancy, shall reply, Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true, shall we not?

188 THEAET. Yes.

188 SOC. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

188 THEAET. What sort of thing?

188 SOC. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

188 THEAET. How can he?

188 SOC. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think one is among the things that are not?

188 THEAET. No, I do not.

188 SOC. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

188 THEAET. That is clear.

189 SOC. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

189 THEAET. Yes.

189 SOC. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

189 THEAET. That also is true.

189 SOC. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

189 THEAET. He must do so.

189 SOC. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

189 THEAET. I agree.

189 SOC. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

189 THEAET. Evidently.

189 SOC. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

189 THEAET. That is plain, apparently.

189 SOC. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

189 THEAET. Evidently.

189 SOC. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not?

189 THEAET. So it seems.

189 SOC. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

189 THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

189 SOC. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

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