244
Str. Is it what you call one, using two names for the same thing, or how is this?
244
Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger?
244
Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.
244
Theaet. Why not?
244
Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.
244
Theaet. Of course it is.
244
Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.
244
Theaet. Why?
244
Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.
244
Theaet. Yes.
244
Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.
244
Theaet. True.
244
Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name. In other words, one, considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word one is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name wlth the thing.
244
Theaet. Necessarily.
244
Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?
244
Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.
244
Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,Parmenides Fr. 8.43then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?
244
Theaet. Certainly.
