249
Str. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?
249
Theaet. Certainly.
249
Str. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.
249
Theaet. What is this again? What do you mean?
249
Str. My dear fellow, don’t you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?
249
Theaet. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.
250
Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold. Cf. 242d above.
250
Theaet. What questions? Remind me.
250
Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.
250
Theaet. That is right.
250
Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?
250
Theaet. Of course.
250
Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?
250
Theaet. Yes, I do.
250
Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?
250
Theaet. By no means.
250
Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?
250
Theaet. Of course not.
250
Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?
250
Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.
250
Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.
250
Theaet. Apparently.
250
Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.
250
Theaet. You are about right.
