250
Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?
250
Theaet. What indeed?
250
Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
250
Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.
250
Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.
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Theaet. What is it?
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Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?
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Theaet. Of course I do.
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Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?
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Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.
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Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.
251
Theaet. Good.
251
Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.
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Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.
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Str. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
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Theaet. True.
