263
Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?
263
Theaet. True.
263
Str. And in speech we know there is just—
263
Theaet. What?
263
Str. Affirmation and negation
263
Theaet. Yes, we know that.
264
Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?
264
Theaet. Certainly not.
264
Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?
264
Theaet. No.
264
Str. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say it seems is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.
264
Theaet. Certainly.
264
Str. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?
264
Theaet. Yes, I see.
264
Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.
264
Theaet. What divisions?
264
Str. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic. See Plat. Theaet. 235d ff
264
Theaet. Yes.
264
Str. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.
264
Theaet. You are right.
264
Str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.
264
Theaet. True.