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İngilizce Yunanca

262 Phaedrus. Never in the world.

262 Socrates. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

262 Phaedrus. Probably.

262 Socrates. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

262 Phaedrus. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

262 Socrates. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

262 Phaedrus. So be it; only make your meaning clear.

262 Socrates. Read me the beginning of Lysias’ discourse.

262 Phaedrus. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—

262 Socrates. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

263 Phaedrus. Yes.

263 Socrates. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

263 Phaedrus. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

263 Socrates. When one says iron or silver, we all understand the same thing, do we not?

263 Phaedrus. Surely.

263 Socrates. What if he says justice or goodness? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

263 Phaedrus. Certainly.

263 Socrates. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

263 Phaedrus. True.

263 Socrates. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

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