128
Soc. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?
128
Alc. Absolutely so.
128
Soc. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.
128
Alc. Apparently.
128
Soc. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.
128
Alc. Not at all.
128
Soc. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.
128
Alc. Apparently not.
128
Soc. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?
128
Alc. I cannot say.
128
Soc. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?
128
Alc. That is true.
128
Soc. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?
128
Alc. Impossible.
128
Soc. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.
128
Alc. True.
128
Soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?
129
Alc. Impossible.
129
Soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?
129
Alc. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.
129
Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.
129
Alc. That is so.
