130
Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.
130
Alc. It seems not.
130
Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?
130
Alc. Perhaps it is.
130
Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.
130
Alc. You are right.
130
Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.
130
Alc. Precisely so.
130
Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?
130
Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.
130
Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.
130
Alc. What is that?
130
Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, Cf. Plat. Alc. 1.129b. that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.
130
Alc. No, indeed.
130
Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?
130
Alc. Quite so.
130
Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.
130
Alc. I believe so.
130
Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.
131
Alc. So it seems.
131
Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.
131
Alc. That is so.
