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Soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?
144
Alc. I think so.
145
Soc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.
145
Alc. That is true.
145
Soc. Then observe the consequence.
145
Alc. If I am able.
145
Soc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?
145
Alc. I do.
145
Soc. And the many unwise, and the few wise?
145
Alc. Precisely.
145
Soc. And in either case you name them in reference to something?
145
Alc. Yes.
145
Soc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?
145
Alc. No, indeed.
145
Soc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?
145
Alc. Agreed.
145
Soc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?
145
Alc. No, to be sure.
145
Soc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not?
145
Alc. Yes.
145
Soc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?
145
Alc. I agree.
