145
Soc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?
145
Alc. I do.
145
Soc. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, ἀνὰ λόγον occurs, with the genitive, in Plat. Tim. 29c; the normal Platonic phrase for our passage is ὡσαύτως. I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?
145
Alc. No, it is as you say.
145
Soc. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?
145
Alc. Far short of it, I declare.
145
Soc. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?
146
Alc. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.
146
Soc. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to thatWherein himself is found most excellent,Eur. Antiope, Fr. Cf. Plat. Gorg. 484e. I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?
146
Alc. We should, upon my word.
