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Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts upPolyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, Protrepticus 127 A, Job iv. 13-14. Tennyson, Vastness ix.—Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light. even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hopeThe better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar Nem. xi. in fine, Sophocles Antigone 615, Thuc. 2.62, Thuc. 3.45. ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as PindarPindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition. too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and pietysweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals. Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a godCf. the famous, We owe a cock to Aesculapius, Phaedo 118 A. Cf. further, Browne, Christian Morals, i. 26 Well content if they be but rich enough to be honest, and to give every man his due. for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth. An admirable sentiment, Cephalus, said I. But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualificationIt is Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se good or bad. Plat. Sym. 181a. This opens the door to casuistry, Xen. Mem. 4.2.12, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the argument cf. Xen. Mem. 4.2.18, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the proverb, a knife to a child or a madman cf. Athen. 5.52, Iambl. Protrep. 18k, Jebb’s Bentley, p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley’s allusion to it. that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state. You are right, he replied. Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received. Nay, but it is, Socrates, said Polemarchus breaking in, if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides. Very well, said Cephalus, indeed I make over the whole argumentThe argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. Philebus 12 A, Charmides 162 E, Protagoras 331 A. to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices. Well, said I, is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours? Certainly, said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.Cicero Ad Att. iv. 16 Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset, Bagehot, Hartley Coleridge, It (metaphysical debate) attracts the scorn of middle-aged men, who depart πρὸς τὰ ἱερά, etc. Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice. That it is just, he replied, to render to each his due.The defintion is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists’ Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens. For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles Righteousness and Theognis in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. In saying this I think he speaks well.
