Kitap 10
602
Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief πίστιν ὀρθήν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθήν below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E. about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge. Certainly. And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinionThis does not contradict book V. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 B and What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.? Neither. Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations. It seems not. Most charming, χαρίεις is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 A and καλόν in Theaet. 183 A, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously. then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations. Not at all. Yet still he will none the lessNote the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Similarly in 619 B, Phaedo 59 D, 61 E, 62 B, 64 A, Parmen. 127 D, Demosth. xxiii. 101, De cor. 282, Pind. Pyth. iv. 64 A, Isoc. Peace 1, Aristot. De gen. et corr. 332 a 3, Iliad vii. 360. imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude. Why, what else? On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,Cf. on 536 C, p. 214, note b. not to be taken seriously,Cf. 608 A. and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,For ἐν ἔπεσι cf. 607 A, 379 A, Meno 95 D. are all altogether imitators. By all means. In heaven’s name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not? Yes. And now again, to what elementThe antithesis of περί and πρός marks the transition. in man is its function and potency related? Of what are you speaking? Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from farCf. Protag. 356 A, 523 C. does not appear equal. Why, no. And the same things appear bent and straightCf. Tennyson (The Higher Pantheism) For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool. For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them Cf. Phileb. 41 E-42 A f., 55 E, Protag. 356 C-D, Euthyphro 7 C. to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation ἐπιθεμένη helps to personify σκιαγραφία. Cf. Gorg. 464 C. of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,Adam’s leaves no magic art untried is misleading. ἀπολείπειν is here used as in 504 C. For the idiomatic οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει see p. 200, note b, on 533 A. and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances. True. And have not measuring and numbering and weighingCf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9. proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparentlyCf. Protag. 356 D ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned λογισάμενον: Cf. Laws 644 D, Crito 46 B. and numbered or even weighed? Certainly. But this surely would be the functionCf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of function are unknown to Plato. of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.For λογιστικοῦ cf. on 439 D. Why, yes, of that. And often when this has measuredSee p. 448, note c, and my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176. and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary. Yes. And did we not say436 B, Vol. I. p. 383. that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing? And we were right in affirming that.
