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And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature. What point? You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.Cf. Theaet. 144 D χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα. For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholenessCf. Goethe’s Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben. in all things human and divine. Most true, he said. Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existenceCf. Theaet. 174 E, of the philosopher, εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 E, 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque, Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128. For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 D, 608 C, Phaedo 107 C, Gorg. 525 C, Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46. can deem this life of man a thing of great concernCf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1123 b 32, the great-souled man, ᾦ γ’ οὐδὲν μέγα, Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic. De fin. iii. 8 infra se omnia humana ducens. Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind Cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, Laws 803 B. Cf. also Laws 708 E-709 B.? Impossible, said he. Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; Laws 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, Gorg. 522 E, Phaedo 77 E, Crito 43 B, Apol. 35 A, 40 C. Cf. Spinoza’s There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death. Least of all. Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy. I think not. What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargainsCf. ibid, Vol. I. on 442 E.? Impossible. This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.Cf. 375 B. Assuredly. Nor will you overlook this, I fancy. What? Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfullyCf. Laches 189 A-B ἀηδῶς μανθάνων and with little resultCf. Theaet. 144 B. from much toil? That could not be. And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,Cf. Theaet. 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra’s Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony (Ant. and Cleo. I. iii. 90). could he fail to be void of knowledge? How could he? And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation? Of course. The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory. By all means. But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion. Certainly. And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the idealἰδέαν is not exactly idea. Cf. Cratyl. 389 B, What Plato Said, p. 358 on Euthyph. 6 D, ibid. p. 560 on Rep. 369 A and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 C-D. Cf. Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347. reality in all things. Assuredly. Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatibleLit. following on upon the other. Cf. Tim. 27 C ἑπομένως, Laws 844 E. with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?
