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567
And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him? Obviously. And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking warsFor ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας.? Yes, he is compelled to do so. And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens? Of course. And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126. and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest? Yes, it is likely. Then the tyrant must do awayCf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim. with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe. Obviously. He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero,οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς. A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power. Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their wayCf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D. to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again, an alienCf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies. and motley crew. παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 C. You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28. would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust.
