Kitap 10
895
Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?
895
Ath. Of what kind?
895
Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.
895
Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?
895
Clin. Most certainly.
896
Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?
896
Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?
896
Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?
896
Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.
896
Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?
896
Clin. True.
896
Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.
896
Clin. Yes, most veracious.
