Kitap 12
965
Ath. Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues, and which,—since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom,— may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of virtue. This element, my friends, we must now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at—whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one? Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely—pass it over we must.
965
Clin. Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger’s God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived?
966
Ath. It is too early to explain how we are to contrive it: let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves as to whether or not we ought to do so.
966
Clin. Well, surely we ought, if we can.
966
Ath. Very well then; do we hold the same view about the fair and the good? Ought our wardens to know only that each of these is a plurality, or ought they also to know how and wherein they are each a unity?
966
Clin. It is fairly obvious that they must necessarily also discern how these are a unity.
966
Ath. Well then, ought they to discern it, but be unable to give a verbal demonstration of it?
966
Clin. Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave.
