Kitap 9
859
Ath. I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.
859
Clin. Would not that be right?
859
Ath. Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that all includes for us passionsi.e. sufferings. nearly as much as actions.
859
Clin. Well, what then?
859
Ath. Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.
859
Clin. Yes.
860
Ath. It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.
860
Clin. True.
860
Ath. But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.
860
Clin. What do you mean by that?
860
Ath. It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.
860
Clin. What statements?
860
Ath. We laid it downPlat. Laws 854b. that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?
860
Clin. I am afraid so.
860
Ath. Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.
860
Clin. It certainly seems so, Stranger.
860
Ath. Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.
