Kitap 9
860
Clin. What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?
860
Ath. I believe that I expressly statedPlat. Laws 731c, Plat. Laws 734b: cp. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1109b.30 ff. in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—
860
Clin. What?
860
Ath. That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.
860
Clin. What statement do you mean?
860
Ath. This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad.In what follows, the Athenian, adopting the Socratic dictum that vice is involuntary (cp. Plat. Tim. 86e ff.), applies it to the special vice of injustice; but here his view is found to conflict with the popular view which distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice, and assigns to them different legal penalties. If this popular distinction is wrong, the lawgiver must either (a) simply apply the Socratic rule, and enact that all unjust acts are involuntary and deserve therefore equal penalties, or (b) draw a new distinction, which Ath. proceeds to do in 861 E ff. (see note ad loc.). But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who, through contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not? Legislate by all means, I shall reply.
