Kitap 1
6
next, even granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for the good life or for conduct.
7
For good has many senses, in fact as many as being. For the term is, as it has been analyzed in other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings it consists now in undergoing change and now in causing it; and the good is found in each of these casesi.e. categories. The last two specified are elsewhere designated κινεῖν and κινεῖσθαι, Action and Passion.—in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as instances of change, the teacher and the taught.
8
Therefore, just as being is not some one thing in respect of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and there is no one science either of the real or of the good. But also even the goods predicated in the same category, for example opportunity or moderation, do not fall within the province of a single science to study, but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation are studied by different sciences, for instance opportunity and moderation in respect of food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military operations by strategics, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science; so that it can hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the subject of only one science.
9
Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior and a subsequent, there is not some common element beside these factors and that element separable;