Kitap 2
7
From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the oppositeViz. that what is against desire is involuntary. follows, for all that a man does voluntarily he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.
8
But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.
9
The same argument applies also in the case of passion;for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even HeracleitusThe natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C. His sentence ended ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρῄζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται, Iamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 140. seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.
