Kitap 2
10
Yet nevertheless if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the statement is refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under force, but voluntarily;
11
nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B’s hand and with it strike C, B’s will and desire both resisting; whereas when the source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done under force.
12
Again, both pleasure and pain are present in both cases; for a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good health;and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is doing a bad thing.
13
Hence it is reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit.
