Kitap 2
6
Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought, but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of all rightness either rational principle or goodness is the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of the rightness of the End, then the End (though not the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness.
7
But the End is the object for which one acts; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the causeVirtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End causes the End to be realized. by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End.
8
Therefore though it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right.
9
And owing to this it is by a man’s purposive choice that we judge his character—that is, not by what he does but what he does it for.
10
Similarly also badness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honorable and refrain from doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily follows that both badness and goodness are voluntary; for there is no necessity to do wicked things.
11
For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and goodness praiseworthy; for involuntary baseness and evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise and blame all men with regard to their purpose rather than with regard to their actions (although activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one is compelled to choose to do them.
