Kitap 3
1
It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.
2
Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b 39, Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221a 17-19. previously we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.
3
It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is derived, as the word daring is cognate with the word dare).
4
So that since courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same things but inversely— they fall short in daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the best state.
