Kitap 8
1
We have, then, previously spoken about each virtue in particular; and as we have distinguished their meaning separately, we must also describe in detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we now give the nameThe Ms. reading gives, we were already giving the name, but if that is correct, the passage referred to has been lost. of nobility.Καλοκἀγαθία, like nobility , connotes both social status and moral excellence; so καλοκἀγαθός may be rendered gentleman.
2
Now it is manifest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must necessarily be in the same condition as the whole.
3
Now being good and being noble are really different not only in their names but also in themselves. For all goods have Ends that are desirable in and for themselves.
4
Of these, all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable, for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength is not—these things are good but they are not laudable.
