Kitap 8
6
But these consequences are absurd, especially that of using wisdom wisely as a result of folly; for that is a thing which we certainly do not see in other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one’s medical knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one’s ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to badness; for example, the just man is capable of all that the unjust man is, and in general inability is contained in ability.
7
So that it is clear that men are wise and good simultaneously, and that the states of character above described belong to a different person, and the Socratic dictum Nothing is mightier than wisdom, is right. But in that by wisdom he meant knowledge, he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of cognition.
1
But wisdom is not the only thing which acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does; we must therefore consider whether one man is fortunate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and how it stands with these matters.
2
For that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which involve skill although also containing a large element of luck—for example strategy and navigation.
