Kitap 1
13
There remains therefore what may be called the practicalPractice for Aristotle denotes purposeful conduct, of which only rational beings are capable, cf. 6.2.2 note. life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,This anticipation of 13.19 is irrelevant, and states decisively a point there left doubtful. Also on grounds of Greek this parenthesis has been suspected as an interpolation, and perhaps we should leave it out and render the preceding words the practical life of a rational being. one rational as obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and exercising intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are here concerned with the active exerciseIn contrast with the mere state of possessing the faculty. of the rational faculty, since this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.
14
If then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul’s facultiesLiterally activity of soul; ψυχή however has a wider connotation than either soul or mind, and includes the whole of the vitality of any living creature. in conformity with rational principle, or at all events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same, the qualification of the latter’s superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul’s faculties and activities in association with rational principle,
