Kitap 1
5
Moreover men’s motive in pursuing honor seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honored by men of judgement and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honored on the ground of virtue. It is clear therefore that in the opinion at all events of men of action, virtue is a greater good than honor;
6
and one might perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honor is the end of the Political Life. But even virtue proves on examination to be too incomplete to be the End; since it appears possible to possess it while you are asleep, or without putting it into practice throughout the whole of your life; and also for the virtuous man to suffer the greatest misery and misfortune—though no one would pronounce a man living a life of misery to be happy, unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox. But we need not pursue this subject, since it has been sufficiently treated in the ordinary discussions.It is not certain whether this phrase refers to written treatises (whether Aristotle’s own dialogues and other popular works, now lost, or those of other philosophers), or to philosophical debates like those which Plato’s dialogues purport to report (as did doubtless those of Aristotle). Cf. De caelo 279a 30 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι, in the ordinary philosophical discussions, and De anima 407b 29 τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις, the discussions that go on in public; and see 13.9 note for similar references to extraneous discussions.
7
The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation, which we shall consider in the sequel.
