Kitap 5
18
Injustice on the contrary is similarly related to that which is unjust, which is a disproportionate excess or deficiency of something beneficial or harmful. Hence Injustice is excess and defect, in the sense that it results in excess and defect: namely, in the offender’s own case, an excess of anything that is generally speaking beneficial and a deficiency of anything harmful, and in the case of others,That is, when A distributes unjustly not between himself and B but between B and C, the result for either B or C may be either excess or defect, either too large a share or too small of something beneficial (and either too small a share or too large of something harmful). though the result as a whole is the same, the deviation from proportion may be in either direction as the case may be.
18
Of the injustice done, the smaller part is the suffering and the larger part the doing of injustice.
19
So much may be said about the nature of Justice and Injustice, and of the Just and the Unjust regarded universally.6.1-2 are an irrelevant fragment which Jackson would insert in 8.8 after βλαβή; 6.3 he would transpose to the beginning of chap. 10; 6.4 continues the end of chap. 5.
1
But seeing that a man may commit injustice without actually being unjust, what is it that distinguishes those unjust acts the commission of which renders a man actually unjust under one of the various forms of injustice, for example, a thief or an adulterer or a brigand? Or shall we rather say that the distinction does not lie in the quality of the act? For a man may have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from the motive of deliberate choice, but under the influence of passion;
2
in such a case, though he has committed injustice, he is not an unjust man: for instance, he is not a thief, though guilty of theft, not an adulterer, though he has committed adultery, and so forth.
3
The relation of Reciprocity to Justice has been stated already.
