Kitap 6
6
Prudence on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men, and with things that can be the object of deliberation. For we say that to deliberate well is the most characteristic function of the prudent man; but no one deliberates about things that cannot vary nor yet about variable things that are not a means to some end, and that end a good attainable by action; and a good deliberator in general is a man who can arrive by calculation at the best of the goods attainable by man.
7
Nor is Prudence a knowledge of general principles only: it must also take account of particular facts, since it is concerned with action, and action deals with particular things. This is why men who are ignorant of general principles are sometimes more successful in action than others who know them: The words for instance . . . chicken is wholesome in the mss. come after theorists. for instance, if a man knows that light meat is easily digested and therefore wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not be so likely to restore you to health as a man who merely knows that chicken is wholesome; and in other matters men of experience are more successful than theorists. And Prudence is concerned with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed knowledge of particular facts even more than knowledge of general principles. Though here too there must be some supreme directing faculty.i.e., πολιτική, Political Science or Statesmanship (cf. Bk. 1.1, 2), the relation of which to Prudence is next considered.
1
Prudence is indeed the same quality of mind as Political Science, though their essence is different.Cf. 5.1.20. Political Wisdom is not a special sort of Prudence but a special application of it, for though the term Prudence is in ordinary usage confined to practical wisdom in one’s private affairs, it really extends to the affairs of one’s family and of the community.
