Kitap 6
6
(The fourth partThe other three are the scientific, calculative, and appetitive parts, see 1.5,6, whose virtues have now been considered in Books 2-6. Sensation is here omitted, since it is not peculiar to man: cf. 1.7.12. of the soul on the other hand, the nutritive faculty, has no virtue contributing to the proper function of man, since it has no power to act or not to act.Digestion and growth function automatically, not voluntarily; so they form no part of conduct.)
7
But we must go a little deeper into the objection that Prudence does not render men more capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should), on the other hand it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves.
8
Now rightness in our choice of an end is secured by Virtuei.e., Moral Virtue.; but to do the actions that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have chosen, is not a matter for Virtue but for a different faculty.
8
We must dwell on this point to make it more clear.
9
There is a certain faculty called Cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty: if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever.
