Kitap 6
8
Of the two parts of the soul possessed of reason, Prudence must be the virtue of one, namely, the part that forms opinionsCalled in 1.6 the Calculative Faculty.; for Opinion deals with that which can vary, and so does Prudence. But yet Prudence is not a rational quality merely, as shown by the fact that a purely rational faculty can be forgotten, whereas a failure in Prudence is not a mere lapse of memory.A loss of Prudence is felt to involve a moral lapse, which shows that it is not a purely intellectual quality.
1
Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity; and demonstrated truths and all scientific knowledge (since this involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first principles from which scientific truths are derived cannot themselves be reached by Science; nor yet are they apprehended by Art, nor by Prudence. To be matter of Scientific Knowledge a truth must be demonstrated by deduction from other truths; while Art and Prudence are concerned only with things that admit of variation. Nor is Wisdom the knowledge of first principles eitheri.e., not exclusively: see 7.3.: for the philosopher has to arrive at some things by demonstration.See 3.4, first note.
2
If then the qualities whereby we attain truth,Cf. 3.1. Art is here omitted from the list. and are never led into falsehood, whether about things invariable or things variable, are scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it remains that first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence.νοῦς now receives its special sense (see 2.1, note) of a particular virtue of the intellect, viz. that faculty of rational intuition whereby it correctly apprehends (by process of induction, see 3.3) undemonstrable first principles. It is thus a part of σοφία (7.3,5).
